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LOST INSIDE THE BELTWAY: A REPLY TO PROFESSOR 
MORRISON  
Bruce Ackerman* 
Watergate.  Iran-Contra.  The Torture Memos.  Three outbreaks of 
illegality in forty years.  But the last time around, President George W. 
Bush was not required to indulge in Nixonesque claims that “when the 
president does it, that means it is not illegal.”1  He could personally ap-
prove waterboarding without conceding its blatant illegality.  As he ex-
plains in Decision Points, the “Department of Justice and CIA lawyers 
conducted a careful legal review,” concluding that it “complied with the 
Constitution and all applicable laws, including those that ban torture.”2  
This is much worse than Nixon’s brazen assertion of power.  Decline 
and Fall predicts there will be more rubber-stamping in the future, un-
less the presidency reforms the way it goes about interpreting “the laws” 
that it must “faithfully execute.” 
Professor Trevor Morrison agrees that the torture memos mark a 
low point for the Office of Legal Counsel.  But he views them as deeply 
regrettable accidents — the result of a “combination of political, ideo-
logical, and psychological factors to which no structure could ever be 
entirely immune.”3  He is right that structural reform can’t provide a 
fool-proof guarantee against future failure; but he is wrong to insist that 
the existing system is basically sound. 
We may be lucky: perhaps future presidents will be wise enough to 
populate the Office of Legal Counsel and the White House Counsel 
with a steady stream of Trevor Morrisons — serious professionals with 
moderate sensibilities.  But as Madison taught us long ago, 
“[e]nlightened statesmen may not always be at the helm.”4  
The presidency’s recent, sorry track- record reinforces this Madi-
sonian maxim.  Decline and Fall points to a series of institutional devel-
opments that increase the likelihood of further outbreaks of illegality.  I 
explore how, over the past forty years, the modern primary system has 
opened the path to extremist candidacies on the left and the right, and 
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1  Interview by David Frost with Richard Nixon (May OM, NVTT), quoted in BRUCE ACKERMAN, 
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC ONV n.N (OMNM) [hereinafter DECLINE]. 
2 GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS NSV (OMNM). 
3 Trevor Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, NOQ HARV. L. REV. NSUU, NTQP (OMNN) [hereinafter 
Alarmism] (reviewing DECLINE, supra note N). 
4 THE FEDERALIST NO. NM, at TR (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., OMMP). 
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how this extremist danger is enhanced by the rise of media manipula-
tors in the White House.  I point to a host of factors that have given the 
President new tools for decisive unilateral action — including the politi-
cization of the commanding heights of the bureaucracy and military, 
the normalization of war-talk and the  use of Gallup Polls to legitimate 
the President’s plebiscitarian pretensions. 
Morrison doesn’t confront this multi-dimensional argument.  His 
sixty-two page review focuses exclusively on one trouble -spot: execu-
tive-branch lawyering.  But he implicitly adopts a dismissive view of 
the broader range of institutional pathologies that occupy the bulk of 
my book.  At points, his complacency becomes explicit, as when he 
shakes his head incredulously when reporting that “Ackerman truly be-
lieves the risk of presidential defiance of the Court is a greater threat 
today than it was under [President Richard Nixon].” 5  
Despite Morrison’s incredulity, this is precisely my book’s thesis.  If 
he rejects my multidimensional argument about the presidency’s grow-
ing danger, it would be nice to tell me why.6  Even without fundamen-
tal analysis, it verges on the Panglossian to suppose that the next gener-
ation will somehow evade the outbreaks of White House illegality that 
have erupted three times within the short space of forty years. 
Once again, Morrison is over-generalizing from his experience in the 
Clinton and Obama Administrations.  Both of his presidents were deep-
ly socialized into the constitutional tradition, even teaching the subject 
in law school.  They were also deal-makers by disposition and centrists 
by political persuasion.  Given their backgrounds, there was little 
chance that they would seek to defy or intimidate the Supreme Court.  
But it is perilous to suppose that our future will be dominated by consti-
tutionalists.  This hasn’t been true in the past, and if my broader argu-
ments are right, it will be even less true in the future. 
This is why the present moment is important.  Precisely because 
President Barack Obama is a constitutionalist, there is a chance — if 
only a small chance — that he might come to see fundamental reform of 
the Office of Legal Counsel and the White House Counsel as part of his 
enduring legacy.  But this chance reduces to zero if the constitutional 
complacency expressed by Morrison carries the day. 
Complacency is already well-entrenched inside the Beltway.  But it 
is precisely the role of the academy to expose the Washington Consen-
sus to critical scrutiny — which is why I’ve rejoined the debate. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
5 Alarmism, supra note P, at NSVU n.OS. 
6 Morrison devotes a single footnote to my larger thesis, but makes it clear that a serious critique is 
beyond the scope of his review.  See id. at NTQU n.OON.  
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I.  THE POLITICIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL 
Morrison’s narrow focus leads him to miss the point of my argu-
ment.  Since he is exclusively concerned with executive-branch lawyer-
ing, he wonders why I haven’t attempted a comprehensive assessment 
of the OLC’s performance — faulting Decline and Fall for failing to at-
tempt a systematic review of OLC precedents, and the like.7  But such a 
show of erudition would have diverted attention from my book’s basic 
question: to what extent can we expect the Office of Legal Counsel and 
the White House Counsel to defend the rule of law when other institu-
tional dynamics are propelling the presidency down a path toward ille-
gality?  
Any serious answer requires selective attention to  episodes that re-
veal how executive-branch lawyers responded to past exercises in presi-
dential unilateralism.  Consider the torture memos: Morrison suggests 
that my intensive analysis of this tragic tale is motivated by “anger” at 
Jay Bybee and John Yoo.8  I plead not guilty.  My focus is motivated by 
my interest in institutional reform: the only way to propose sensible 
change is to understand how the existing system has broken down in 
previous crises of legality.   
My approach is similar to the Federal Reserve’s in the aftermath of 
the recent economic crisis.  When it conducts “stress tests” of the bank-
ing system, the Fed isn’t interested in a comprehensive analysis of all 
the good and bad things that banks do for us in normal times; it looks at 
the past only to determine how to reduce the risk of future crises.  So 
too here: I treat Jay Bybee and John Yoo in the same way the Fed 
might treat Lloyd Blankfein: if civil sanctions on particular individuals 
will reduce the risk of future institutional breakdowns, they should be 
seriously considered; if not, their punishment should be left to the re-
tributivists amongst us.  I am looking forward, not backward, — to the 
best way to reduce the risk of more outbursts of presidential illegality, 
not the best way to persecute/prosecute past wrongdoers.9 
But, of course, Morrison’s long review does much more than ques-
tion my motives; it is largely devoted to contesting the accuracy of some 
of my factual and legal claims.  As a consequence, much of his essay de-
velops these disagreements.  This is entirely understandable, but it 
should not conceal our agreement on many matters.  I begin by search-
ing for common ground — and try to persuade you that, without enter-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
7 See id. at NTMU–MV. 
8 Id. at NTPM. 
9 For a similarly forward-looking approach to an analogous problem, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE 
FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION SV–VU (NVVO), which opposes the use of the criminal law by the 
post-NVUV regimes of Eastern Europe when dealing with  Communist collaborators during the So-
viet era). 
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ing into contested territory, there is more than enough material to make 
out my case for fundamental reform. 
A.  Common Ground 
There was a time, not so long ago, when the OLC resembled today’s 
Solicitor General’s office in its personnel.  Until President Jimmy Carter 
changed the practice, only the Assistant Attorney General and one 
Deputy were political appointees at both the OLC and the SG.  The 
other OLC -staffers were long-time government lawyers.10  These sea-
soned veterans had seen lots of political appointees come and go, and 
were skilled in the art of deflecting short-term presidential imperatives 
that challenged deep-rooted constitutional traditions. 
This continues to be true in the SG’s office, but not in the OLC.  In 
recent administrations, political appointees have generally occupied all 
leading positions.11  The rest of the staff is dominated by youngish “at-
torney-advisors” with fancy clerkships, and the like.  Most stay for no 
more  than two or three years before moving onward and upward.12  As 
Morrison recognizes, this leaves room only for a “few . . . members of 
the Senior Executive Service [who] have the title Senior Counsel”13 — 
two or three in recent administrations.14 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
10 See DECLINE, supra note N, at NNQ; John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the 
Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, NR CARDOZO L. REV. 
PTR, QOR n.NUS (NVVP). 
11 See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, NMP 
MICH. L. REV. STS, TNS (OMMR) (“[A]ll of the OLC deputies are politically appointed.”).  There are 
exceptions, often involving cases in which senior government lawyers rotate into vacant jobs as 
deputies until they are filled by new political appointees.  Caroline Krass is a problematic excep-
tion to this rule.  She served for nine years at the OLC and is now a Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General.  The problem arises because her OLC career was interrupted by a two-year stint at 
Obama’s WHC — as a consequence, she has obtained her present position only by passing muster 
at the White House.  See Meet the Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/olc/meet-olc.html (last visited May OR, OMNN).  Her appointment 
does not suggest the emergence of a regular practice reserving one or more deputy slots for career 
lawyers. 
12 As John O. McGinnis explains, attorney-advisors move on quickly because OLC’s specialized 
work doesn’t provide them with “readily transferrable skill[s]” that allow them to get highly paid 
jobs in the private sector if they stay in the office for more than two or three years.  McGinnis, su-
pra note NM, at QOQ, QOR & n.NUS.  Writing more recently than McGinnis, Bradley Lipton describes 
the same dynamic: “Since most OLC attorney-advisor positions turn over within each administra-
tion, the political appointees at the top can easily staff the rest of the office with like-minded law-
yers.”  Bradley Lipton, Essay, A Call for Institutional Reform of the Office of Legal Counsel, Q 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. OQV, ORR (OMNM).  Morrison agrees that many attorney-advisers “work in 
the office for just a few years . . . .”  Alarmism, supra note P, at NTNM. 
13 Id. 
14 See generally, CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTORY: Search, GPO ACCESS, http://www.gpo 
access.gov/cdirectory/search.html (last visited May OR, OMNN) (containing data from the Clinton 
Administration to the present). 
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Which leads to a fundamental question.  Morrison relies heavily on 
the “norms” and “longstanding traditions” of the OLC to serve as a 
bulwark against presidential overreaching.  But given the composition 
of the Office, precisely who is supposed to be safeguarding this  
tradition? 
If we credit Madison’s maxim, we can’t count on the Administra-
tion’s appointees to do the job — “enlightened statesmen” will only 
sometimes manipulate the political networks required to get these plum 
jobs.  And surely youngish up-and-comers are unlikely repositories of 
the very complex “tradition” Morrison describes — by definition, it 
takes a good deal of time to master the practice of providing opinions 
that, in the words of Jack Goldsmith, are “neither like advice from a 
private attorney nor like a politically neutral ruling from a court.  It is 
something inevitably, and uncomfortably, in between.”15  As his mem-
oirs suggest, even Goldsmith had trouble enacting this “awkward” role 
during the nine months he served as head of the OLC before he quit 
under pressure from the Bush White House.16  It’s a bit much to ask 
young attorney-advisers to serve as the principal guardians of these 
“cultural norms.”  This puts an enormous burden on the (very) small 
number of senior counsel. 
Morrison assures us “that Senior Counsels play a vital role in OLC 
precisely because they are such rich repositories of institutional 
memory.”17  While they surely help the transient- lawyers “resist the 
importuning of  . . . clients”18 in garden variety cases, it is unrealistic to 
expect them effectively to defend entrenched constitutional principles 
against high-priority presidential initiatives — especially when political 
appointees, aided by able attorney-advisers, think up all sorts of clever 
legal arguments to evade and undercut these principles. 
The senior counsel’s position is particularly problematic at present.  
Granting their role as keepers of institutional memory, precisely what 
are they supposed to be remembering about the operation of the Office 
during the Bush years? 
To be sure, Goldsmith’s legalistic scruples, and the Abu Ghraib 
scandal, forced the White House to accept the repudiation of a couple of 
“torture memos.”19  But as Morrison recognizes, the OLC replaced 
Yoo’s memos “with a more modestly phrased opinion in late OMMQ . . . 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
15 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTNQ (quoting Jack Goldsmith, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW 
AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION PR (OMMT)). 
16 Goldsmith resigned when “important people inside the administration had come to question my 
fortitude for the job, and my reliability” GOLDSMITH, supra note NR, at NSN (OMMT) (emphasis add-
ed), quoted in DECLINE, supra note N, at NMT. 
17 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTOP. 
18 Id. 
19 DECLINE, supra note N, at NMT. 
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[which] maintained its basic position on the legality of  . . . ‘waterboard-
ing’”20 throughout the rest of the Bush Administration.  So if the old-
timers act as memory- keepers, are they supposed to tell the transients 
that the OLC continued to give the Bush White House what it wanted 
to the bitter end, merely toning down John Yoo’s extravagant legal ar-
guments? 
Morrison ignores this question as he repeatedly emphasizes the stay-
ing power of the Office’s traditions.  But perhaps we might find the 
source of better norms in some other place — not in the OLC’s institu-
tional memory, but in its ongoing practice of opinion -writing.  Day in 
and day out, the staff supplies the executive departments with advice 
on countless legal problems.  When preliminary efforts at resolution 
don’t work out, the Office requests brief-like submissions before it 
works out its own position.  This briefing requirement can help support 
the distinctive OLC norms that Morrison applauds: as the OLC legal 
team sits down to work, it often confronts rigorous briefs representing 
two (or more) departmental views of the applicable law.  This practice 
encourages a similarly disciplined response from the opinion- writers as 
they  explain to each department where it has gone wrong. 
The problem comes when the White House gets into the act.  As 
Morrison recognizes, the President’s lawyers “need not specify their re-
quests in writing, and they are often afforded greater informal access to 
OLC while it is considering their requests.”21  Morrison supplements 
this bland description in a footnote: 
As Ackerman puts the last point, “White House lawyers are in constant con-
tact with their counterparts at the OLC.  For example, Elena Kagan and 
Walter Dellinger recalled exchanging lengthy phone calls in which Kagan, 
then in the White House Counsel’s office, tried to convince Dellinger, the 
head of the OLC, to change his mind about legal issues.”22 
But this constant ex parte contact raises an obvious question: if it’s 
OK for Kagan to get on the phone and try to convince Dellinger, why 
isn’t it equally OK for future David Addingtons to browbeat future 
OLCs to take extremist positions on presidential power?  
The contrast with the Office’s departmental practice is painfully 
obvious: Morrison concedes that “the tolerance of telephone calls and 
other importuning from the White House . . . can create extra pres-
sure.”23  And he also recognizes that the White House is never obliged 
to put its arguments into a written submission — allowing it to continue 
“importuning” without ever trying to work out the serious legal implica-
tions of its telephone chatter. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
20 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTOS n.NQQ. 
21 Id. at NTNM (citation omitted). 
22 Id. at NTNM n.UT (quoting DECLINE, supra note N, at OPN n.QP). 
23 Id. at NTON. 
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But such unremitting pressures, Morrison assures us, are “not 
new,”24 since the Attorney General’s capacity “to resist presidential 
power in extreme circumstances has always been imperfect.”25  He 
points to famous episodes during the Civil War and the run-up to 
World War II to support this claim.26  But he forgets that a lot has 
changed since NVQR.27  For starters, the Attorney General has now re-
tired from the opinion-writing business,28 first leaving the job to a rela-
tively apolitical OLC until NVTS, but then allowing it to become highly 
politicized after Jimmy Carter changed staffing policies.29  What is 
more, intense presidential pressures for legal rubber-stamping are no 
longer solely the product of “extreme circumstances.”  They are now an 
inextricable part of ordinary American politics — as Decline and Fall 
seeks to establish by pointing to the political, bureaucratic, and military 
transformations of the past forty years.  All this is very “new” indeed. 
None of these dynamics are irresistible.30  Despite Morrison’s con-
trary suggestion, Decline and Fall specifically enumerates leading cases 
in which the modern OLC has indeed defended its “best view of the 
law” against the White House’s short-term political imperatives.31  And 
I very much share Morrison’s hopes that these proud moments will con-
tinue into the future.  But — need I remind you? — “enlightened 
statesmen will not always be at the helm.” 
Worse yet, even “enlightened statesmen” might hesitate before say-
ing “no” under the present set-up.  As Morrison explains, the OLC’s of-
ficial policy is to try its hardest to say “yes” — in the words of its Best 
Practices Memo: “to recommend lawful alternatives to Executive 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at NTOO. 
26 Id. at NTNV. 
27 I say that he “forgets,” since he is perfectly aware of these changes at other points in his argu-
ment — as the following discussion indicates.  Nevertheless, he does take comfort in the fact that 
the current politicized arrangement has “been in place for decades,” id. at NTMU — thirty-five years 
to be precise — while only experiencing one blatant breakdown during the second Bush Admin-
istration (eight years out of thirty-five).  But as he also recognizes, the “pro-executive tenor” of the 
OLC’s decisionmaking was already well advanced before the Bush fiasco, id. at NTNS, and it is an 
open question whether Obama’s early repudiation of the torture memos was merely a strategic re-
treat that prepares the way for further presidentialist advances, see infra pages SM–OSN. 
28 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTPR. 
29 See supra notes NM–NQ and accompanying text. 
30 See Alarmism, supra note P, at NTNV, where Morrison refutes the view — supposing it to be 
mine — that “OLC invariably says yes to the White House on significant issues.”  To the contrary, 
I believe that institutions are never irresistible forces that “invariably” determine outcomes — they 
only create dynamics that predispose decisionmakers in a particular direction.  
31 Compare DECLINE, supra note N, at OOR n.OT (enumerating some of the same cases that Morri-
son cites in recalling the OLC moments of resistance), with the list provided by Alarmism, supra 
note P, at NTNU. 
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Branch proposals that it decides would be unlawful.”32  Morrison 
agrees that “there is a danger that OLC will over-identify with its cli-
ents . . . , compromising its legal advice to accommodate them.”33 
The problem is confirmed by Morrison’s very useful data analysis, 
which shows that only thirteen percent of OLC opinions have provided 
a more- or- less clear “no” to the White House during the past genera-
tion.34  Morrison’s data- set doesn’t include OLC’s unpublished opin-
ions — which typically involve confidential matters involving national 
security.  Since OLC is almost- certainly more deferential to the White 
House in these sensitive areas, the percentage of “no’s” would likely 
sink into the single- digits if these secret opinions could be included in 
Morrison’s data set.35  And remember, quantitative data can’t take into 
account the occasions on which the White House is especially exigent in 
its telephonic demands.36   
The danger of “over-identification” is magnified further by the 
OLC’s dualistic understanding of its mission — in the words of its 
Guidelines, it “serves both the institution of the presidency and a par-
ticular incumbent, democratically elected President.”37  This means, ac-
cording to the Guidelines, that the Office should “reflect the institution-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
32 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTNR (quoting Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant 
Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Att’ys of the Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Best Practices for 
OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions (July NS, OMNM), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf)). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at NTNT–NU. 
35 Morrison notes that the unpublished opinions represent a “significant limitation” of his study, 
id. at NTNT n.NNN, but does not consider how their focus on national security matters is likely to bias 
his estimates in a systematic fashion. 
36 Morrison is undoubtedly right in suggesting that stare decisis plays a restraining role in garden-
variety cases.  But he also notes that the OLC overrules (or substantially modifies) its own deci-
sions in more than five percent of the opinions in his sample.  See Alarmism, supra note P, at NTOP 
n.NPN.  This is a significant percentage, given my focus on the likely way the OLC will function in 
high-stress situations.  It indicates that stare decisis is by no means a rigid rule, and that the OLC 
cannot credibly claim that its hands are tied when the White House is pressuring it to overrule ex-
isting case- law to vindicate a high-priority presidential initiative.  
  Similarly, Morrison is undoubtedly correct in suggesting that his data fails to reflect the fact 
that the OLC sometimes informally deflects the White House from a legally problematic initiative.  
See Alarmism, supra note P, at NTNV.  But on high-priority initiatives, the White House won’t easily 
take an informal “no” for an answer — it will either push the OLC to write a formal opinion saying 
“yes” or it will withdraw the issue from its jurisdiction and rely on the WHC to uphold the legality 
of the President’s plan.  As a consequence, I believe that Morrison’s data provides an over-
estimate, not an under-estimate, of likely OLC resistance: it fails to count unreported national se-
curity opinions (on which the OLC is probably extremely deferential), and this failure is not miti-
gated by its additional failure to detect informal modes of OLC resistance. 
37 Id. at NTNR (emphasis added) (quoting Memorandum from Walter E. Dellinger, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (Dec. ON, OMMQ) 
[hereinafter OLC Guidelines], reprinted in Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: In-
ternal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, RQ UCLA L. REV. NRRV, app. O, at NSMS (OMMT)). 
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al traditions and competencies of the executive branch as well as the 
views of the President who currently holds office.”38 
Morrison endorses this view, but fails to reflect on its complexities.  
He elaborates with great subtlety on the first branch of the OLC’s mis-
sion statement — the part that expresses the distinctive “traditions and 
competences” developed over the long haul.  But he is tight-lipped when 
it comes to the second aspect — which seems to give the sitting Presi-
dent the authority to override long-standing traditions and insist that 
the OLC follow his short-term views.  Morrison defers this “complex” 
question for future elaboration,39 but he is “sure[]” about one thing: the 
President has the right “to privilege certain interpretive approaches to 
the Constitution over others, as a result of which certain policies will be 
deemed constitutional that would not be according to other interpretive 
approaches.”40 
Morrison’s moment of certainty throws his larger argument into ut-
ter confusion.  He wishes to reassure us that the “cultural norms” of the 
Office provides its members with robust resources to resist White 
House pressure; but this claim undercuts itself if the Office’s cultural 
norms authorize wide-ranging deference to the constitutional views ex-
pressed by the “democratically elected President.” 
Consider the case of John Yoo.  Morrison plainly believes that Yoo’s 
interpretation of the Founding is wrong, and I agree, but we can’t pre-
tend to speak for the academy.  After all, Yoo gained his tenured pro-
fessorship precisely because his Berkeley colleagues thought highly of 
his “interpretive approach to the Constitution.”  “Surely,” President 
Bush could decide that what was good enough for Berkeley was good 
enough for him? 
 After all, Morrison and the Guidelines authorize the sitting Presi-
dent to “privilege” his approach “over others.”  So when some future 
Addington calls up the OLC, and orders it to reinstate Yoo-style “inter-
pretive approaches” in its opinions, he can cite Morrison, as well as the 
OLC Guidelines, in support.  And when political appointees turn to 
OLC old-timers for advice, they will learn that the OLC defended wa-
terboarding until a new President was elected who rejected his prede-
cessor’s “interpretive approach.”  So why shouldn’t future OLCs also 
defer to the sitting President’s commands until the voters take a differ-
ent course in the next election?  
Morrison’s predicament expresses a dilemma afflicting an entire 
generation of elite lawyers who have been moving in- and- out of the 
OLC in synch with the election returns.  They very much want to draw 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
38 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting OLC Guidelines, supra note PT, at NSMS). 
39 Id. at NTQS n.ONU.  He does, however, provide some further reflections in Trevor W. Morrison, 
Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, NNM COLUM. L. REV. NQQU, NRNR–NU (OMNM). 
40 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTQS at n.ONU. 
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a clear line between Yoo and themselves; but they subscribe to Guide-
lines that commit them to give special weight to the “views of the Presi-
dent who currently holds office.”41  This makes it tough for them to re-
sist when the White House tells them that the sitting President adopts 
an emphatically broad view of his powers. 
All in all, Neal Katyal’s downbeat appraisal of the situation seems 
at least as realistic as Morrison’s upbeat view: 
[T]he political pressure on OLC officials is unavoidably immense.  They 
are, after all, political appointees themselves — the head of the office and 
all its deputies are politically appointed.  They are expected to advise the 
President, rather than merely adjudicate disputes, and are regularly present 
at White House meetings.  In this climate, there is simply no way that the 
OLC’s aspirational purpose of acting as a neutral decision-maker can play 
out in practice the way one would hope.  Simply put, the OLC is composed 
of lawyers with a client to serve.42  
B.  Professional Misconduct? 
These problematic dynamics make the Justice Department’s official 
inquiry into Jay Bybee and John Yoo especially important.  If the De-
partment had condemned their torture memos as unprofessional, this 
would have imposed serious limits on the sitting President’s authority 
to revolutionize the Office’s “interpretive approach.”  But the Depart-
ment refused to sanction Bybee or Yoo — leaving the door open for fu-
ture cave-ins. 
The Department did not reach its decision lightly.  After an inten-
sive five-year investigation, its well-respected Office of Professional Re-
sponsibility found that Bybee and Yoo were indeed guilty of “profes-
sional misconduct.”43  Typically, this finding would be transmitted to 
the relevant bar associations, making disbarment likely.44  But in early 
OMNM, Obama’s Justice Department repudiated OPR’s conclusions, in a 
final judgment written by David Margolis, another highly respected 
long-time government lawyer.45  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
41 Id. at NTNR (quoting OLC Guidelines, supra note PT, at NSMS). 
42 Neal Kumar Katyal, Toward Internal Separation of Powers, NNS Yale L.J.  Pocket Part NMS, NMV 
(OMMS), available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/SU.pdf.   
43 OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION INTO THE 
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL 
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED 
TERRORISTS OSM (July OV, OMMV) [hereinafter OPR REPORT], available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/oprfinalreportMVMTOV.pdf. 
44 See id. at NN n.NM. 
45 See Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., 
Re: Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections to the Findings of Professional Miscon-
duct in the Office of Professional Responsibility’s Report of Investigation into the Office of Legal 
Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s  
Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists O (Jan. R, OMNM)  
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Future political appointees are now on notice: if they are tempted to 
follow in the footsteps of Bybee and Yoo, the Department will do its 
utmost to save them from charges of “professional misconduct” — even 
if the Office of Professional Responsibility goes on the war path, and 
even if political power has passed to their political opponents.46 
Res ipsa loquitur, one would have supposed.  But Morrison sharply 
disagrees — please note that this is the first point at which we are seri-
ously disputing the fact of the matter.  He denies my contention that the 
Department “completely exonerated Bybee and Yoo,”47 pointing out 
that Margolis criticized them for “poor judgment,” and especially con-
demned Yoo for allowing “his own ideology and convictions” to “cloud[] 
his view of his obligation to his client.”48  But these slaps on the wrist 
make the precedential force of DOJ’s decision worse, not better: when 
the next OLC official succumbs to “ideological” conviction in defense of 
a presidential power- grab, you can be sure he will be citing these words 
from Margolis’s opinion when defending himself against charges of 
“professional misconduct.” 
Morrison also takes me to task for calling Margolis’s decision “fi-
nal,” since bar associations remain free to institute disbarment proceed-
ings even without a referral.49  But the judgment was as final as the 
Justice Department could make it, and everybody else has treated it 
that way. 
Begin with Judge Bybee: When he appeared at his confirmation 
hearings, the torture memos had not yet been leaked to the public.  
Nevertheless, Senators did have the foresight to ask him asked about 
his role in national security matters.  Bybee stone-walled, refusing to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
[hereinafter Margolis Memorandum], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ 
DAGMargolisMemoNMMNMR.pdf. 
46 For a critique of the Margolis opinion, see David Luban, David Margolis is Wrong, SLATE (Feb. 
OO, OMNM), http://www.slate.com/id/OOQRRPN/.  See generally, What Went Wrong: Torture and the 
Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Adminis-
trative Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, NNNth Cong. (OMNM) 
(statement of David Luban, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center). 
47 DECLINE, supra note N, at NMU. 
48 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTOT (quoting Margolis Memorandum, supra note QR, at ST).  As the 
following passage makes clear, I did not overlook Margolis’s wrist-slapping exercise: 
After six years of collective pondering, [the department] completely exonerated Bybee 
and Yoo of all charges of unprofessional conduct. 
The department recognized that the torture memos had represented “incomplete and one-
sided” arguments, and that Jack Goldsmith, in withdrawing them, found that they had 
“no foundation in prior OLC opinions, or in judicial decisions, or in any other source of 
law.”  But this wasn’t enough, in its judgment, to say that the opinion writers had acted 
unprofessionally. 
DECLINE, supra note N, at NMU. 
49 Alarmism at NTOT. 
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answer on the grounds of executive privilege.50  By the time the torture 
memos came out, he was safely ensconced on the Ninth Circuit.51 
After the Democratic sweep in November OMMU, impeachment be-
came a distinct possibility — with Bybee collecting a special defense 
fund to respond effectively to the challenges ahead.52  But the Margolis 
report stopped the movement dead in its tracks.  Here is Senator Harry 
Reid, majority leader of the Senate, responding to its publication: 
[“]Career officials at the Department of Justice made considered judgments 
about the content of the memos and the discipline Bybee and Yoo should 
face, and Senator Reid believes it is appropriate to defer to their final deci-
sions,” spokesman Jon Summers said . . . .53 
Morrison notwithstanding, Senator Reid is under the impression 
that Margolis’s opinion was “final.”  Future leaders of the OLC are on 
notice that, so long as the President moves them onto the federal courts 
before their OLC memos leak to the press, they will preside for decades 
in their distinguished positions.  This risk-reward ratio will reinforce the 
larger cultural dynamics propelling the Office to “yes” — though doubt-
less some resolute souls will resist temptation.   
But Morrison wants to emphasize the downside risks — so he un-
derstandably shifts his attention from Judge Bybee to Professor Yoo, 
declaring the latter “a virtual pariah in the academy.”54  I wish he’d tell 
that to the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and the Wall 
Street Journal, which regularly treat Yoo as a leading constitutional 
thinker on their op-ed pages.55  And America’s successful strike against 
Osama bin Laden has provided Yoo with more high-visibility opportu-
nities to claim vindication for his torture memos.56 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
50 See Bruce Ackerman, Impeach Jay Bybee, SLATE (Jan. NP, OMMV), http://www.slate.com 
/id/OOMURNT/. 
51 Judge Bybee was confirmed by the Senate on March NP, OMMP.  The torture memos were not re-
leased until June OO, OMMQ.  See Henry Weinstein, Conservative Confirmed as Vth Circuit Judge, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. NQ, OMMP, at BS; David Johnston & James Risen, Aides Say Memo Backed Coer-
cion Already in Use, N.Y. TIMES, June OT, OMMQ, at AN. 
52 Anticipating the Democratic victory, Bybee had actually established his fund in July, OMMU.  See 
Michael Isikoff, Torture Memo Author Sets Up Defense Fund to Fight Possible Impeachment, 
Newsweek (Nov. NV, OMMV), http://www.newsweek.com/blogs/declassified/OMMV/NN/NV/torture-
memo-author-sets-up-defense-fund-to-fight-possible-impeachment.html. 
53 Steve Tetrault, “Torture Memo” Author Backed, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Feb. OS, OMNM, at QB. 
54 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTOU (quoting Michael C. Dorf, Why President Obama Should Con-
sider Pardoning Those Who Designed, Authorized, and Carried Out the Bush Policy of Abusing 
Detainees, FINDLAW (Apr. OO, OMMV), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/OMMVMQOO.html). 
55 Between January N, OMMS, and May Q, OMNN, Yoo published six op-eds for the New York Times, 
eight for the Los Angeles Times, and twenty-three for the Wall Street Journal.  He is also a regular 
contributor to the Philadelphia Inquirer and other significant journals of opinion.  (A complete list 
of articles is on file with the Harvard Law School Library.) 
56 See, e.g., John Yoo, From Guantanamo to Abbottabad, WALL ST. J., May Q, OMNN, at ANT; see 
also Symposium: Bin Laden, No More, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (May O, OMNN), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/print/OSSOTN. 
  
OMNN] LOST INSIDE THE BELTWAY OR 
Only time will tell whether John Yoo will rehabilitate himself suffi-
ciently to get a job with the next Republican administration.  Since Yoo 
escaped censure for professional misconduct, and since there is no real-
istic chance of his disbarment,57 his prospects for future White House 
service don’t look too bad.  While life may be a bit uncomfortable at 
Berkeley, he will gain consolation from cheer-leaders for his latest op-ed 
at the American Enterprise Institute, where he is a visiting scholar.58  
More to the point, his supporters at AEI and the Federalist Society59 
will help a lot in his campaign to win a big White House job in the next 
Republican administration.  So long as Yoo avoids vacationing in the 
Costa Brava, it’s far too soon to count him out. 
Putting Yoo’s personal fate to one side, there are many other law-
yers and professors with Yoo-like views who would be honored to ac-
cept an appointment at the OLC or the White House.  While the torture 
memos have been the object of blistering critique, this has not discredit-
ed the larger scholarly movement that glorifies presidential preroga-
tive.60  Indeed, new super-presidentialist scholarship is appearing at 
Harvard and Chicago Law Schools that makes Yoo’s jurisprudence 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
57 Yoo argues that Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations precludes any disbarment proceedings for 
his conduct after March NP, OMMT.  See MIGUEL A. ESTRADA, Response to the U.S. Department of 
Justice Office of Professional Responsibility Final Report Dated July OV, OMMV, at NO (Oct. V, OMMV), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/YooResponseMVMTOV.pdf.  Whatever the validi-
ty of this particular argument, it is now OMNN, and there is a significant problem by this point.  In 
any event, the Pennsylvania Bar has rebuffed repeated requests for his disbarment filed by a coali-
tion of activist groups, called Velvet Revolution.  This group also filed a similar complaint with the 
D.C. bar in November OMMV, see Velvet Revolution, Re: Complaint against John  
Choon Yoo (Nov. OM, OMMV), available at http://www.velvetrevolution.us/torture_lawyers/docs/ 
Yoo_Dc_Complaint.pdf, but it has received no response after eighteen months.  See Email from 
Velvet Revolution Staff (May T, OMNN) (on file with author). 
  Morrison also mentions a case in which Jose Padilla is suing John Yoo for his role in legiti-
mating Padilla’s detention as an illegal enemy combatant.  See Alarmism, supra note P, at NTOU–OV.  
While a district court held that Padilla allegation’s sufficed to allow him to proceed, Padilla v. 
Yoo, SPP F. Supp. Od NMMR (N.D. Cal. OMMV), the Ninth Circuit will reconsider the decision follow-
ing the Supreme Court’s resolution of Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, RUM F.Pd. VQV (Vth Cir. OMMV).  See Or-
der Vacating Submission, Padilla, SPP F. Supp. Od NMMR, No. MV-NSQTU (Vth Cir. Oct. NU, OMNM). 
58 Yoo is a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.  Scholars and Fellows: John Yoo, 
AM. ENTERPRISE INST., http://www.aei.org/scholar/TQ (last visited May OR, OMNN). 
59 In OMMN, the Federalist Society awarded Yoo the Paul M. Bator Award for his “demonstrated 
excellence in legal scholarship.”  Paul M. Bator Award, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, http://www.fed-
soc.org/aboutus/id.TT/default.asp (last visited May OR, OMNN).  He has since been a speaker at at 
least sixteen distinct events.  Prof. John C. Yoo, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, http://www.fed-
soc.org/publications/author/john-c-yoo (last visited May OR, OMNN). 
60 See, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (OMMU); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, UP GEO. L.J. ONT, OSP–SQ (NVVQ); 
Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, VS 
GEO. L.J. NSNP (OMMU). 
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seem tame by comparison.61  Ideas matter: with a significant proportion 
of the rising legal elite learning its law from presidentialist professors, 
one or another true believer will be tempted to put these theories into 
practice if and when he finds himself a job at the OLC.  As we have 
seen, Morrison leaves this option open in defending the President’s au-
thority to transform his administration’s “privileged approach” to con-
stitutional interpretation.  And in considering whether a dramatic shift 
makes sense, future OLC lawyers will be perfectly aware that the De-
partment protected Yoo against disbarment the last time around. 
Morrison is just kidding himself when he thinks that this won’t 
make a difference.  It’s one thing to suffer the bitter-sweet pleasures of 
Yoo-style martyrdom; it’s quite another, to be barred forever from the 
practice of law.  The Department’s decision has significantly increased 
the looming risk of presidential rubber-stamping at the OLC. 
II.  THE RISE OF THE WHITE HOUSE COUNSEL 
The WHC has thus far remained in the background — on the other 
side of the telephone, as it were, urging the political appointees at the 
OLC to defer to the President’s “democratic mandate” when developing 
their legal views.  But it is time to confront the dramatic rise in the 
counsel’s prestige and influence over the past thirty years.  These ongo-
ing dynamics permit the WHC to supplant the OLC as the President’s 
public legal voice during the next constitutional crisis. 
Morrison disputes my account by focusing on four episodes from 
Carter to Bush II that, according to him, serve as the entire basis for my 
claim.  He finds that only one survives his critique, and that my treat-
ment of the others is “patently false.”62  But Morrison has somehow 
missed my discussion of other important cases.  As to “patent” falsities, 
Morrison cannot point to a single mistake of fact in my presentation — 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
61 See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND (OMNN), which seeks to 
throw off the last remaining bonds of “liberal legalism,” and to recognize that “[t]he Madisonian 
framework is broken and cannot be . . . adapted to the administrative state.”  Id. at NR.  Instead of 
following the Founders, the authors look for inspiration to the leading Nazi theorist, Carl Schmitt, 
“at least when demystified and rendered into suitably pragmatic and institutional terms.”  Id. at Q. 
  Posner and Vermeule’s argument serves as a mirror-image of Morrison’s analysis.  He thinks 
I’m an alarmist, and that a soberly realistic view of the present executive legal establishment 
makes it clear that major reforms are unnecessary.  They think my “diagnoses of decline” are en-
tirely realistic — indeed that they “are so convincing that [my] prescriptions for revival are futile.”  
Id. at ONP n.N.  While Morrison and Posner/Vermeule are poles apart on the accuracy of my diagno-
ses, they converge on a critical point.  Both agree — if for opposite reasons — that the Obama Ad-
ministration should put on the backburner any serious reforms that might significantly reduce the 
risk of another catastrophic outbreak of presidential illegality.   
62 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTPR. 
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as I will show in a series of footnotes.  I reserve the text to discuss 
events that Morrison failed to appreciate the first time around.63 
But let us begin, once again, from some common ground.  As Morri-
son recognizes, the White House staff is a modern creation.64  During 
the first NRM years of American history, the number of slots for high-
powered professionals in the White House was zero.  On legal matters, 
presidents were entirely dependent on the Attorney General. 
Things began to change in NVPV, when Congress granted President 
Franklin Roosevelt the power to name six presidential assistants in the 
Executive Reorganization Act.65  And in NVQP, he gave his old friend, 
Sam Rosenman, the title of “special counsel” when appointing him to 
his newly -established staff.  Despite this title, Rosenman was not pro-
vided with a professional team of assistants that would have enabled 
him to do serious legal work.  He served instead as a high-powered po-
litical advisor and leading speechwriter — chiming in with passing legal 
judgments only occasionally.  This set the pattern for the next genera-
tion.  Without a legal staff of their own, White House counsel were in 
no position to compete with the Justice Department as the authoritative 
legal voice for the executive branch. 
 Richard Nixon continued this tradition by naming a senior political 
advisor, John Ehrlichman, to the job — but when he shifted Ehrlich-
man to the newly created Domestic Policy Council, the vacancy was 
filled by the thirty-year-old John Dean.  This up-and-comer lacked the 
heft required to play the traditional role of senior advisor.  So he strug-
gled to make himself useful by recruiting a small staff of five to provide 
low-level legal advice to White House personnel. 
And thus was born the modern Counsel’s office — which in time 
would possess the high-powered staff that could compete with the OLC 
as an authoritative legal interpreter.  But this wouldn’t happen over-
night.  Given Dean’s involvement in Watergate, the very existence of 
the office was very much in doubt — until Jimmy Carter named Lloyd 
Cutler, one of the great lawyer-statesmen of his generation, to the job in 
NVTV. 
Cutler transformed the job.  Morrison to the contrary notwithstand-
ing, Cutler made the key legal decision to send in the helicopters during 
the Iran hostage crisis, cutting the OLC out of the process entirely.66  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
63 I also provide briefer footnote treatments of other examples of White House legal leadership 
that Morrison fails to notice.  See infra note TS. 
64 See Alarmism, supra note P, at NTPN, where Morrison signs on to the account presented at pages 
NNM to NNQ of Decline and Fall and their accompanying endnotes.  The following paragraphs pro-
vide a brief summary. 
65 Pub. L. No. TS-NV, RP Stat. RSN (codified at R U.S.C. § NPP (OMMS)). 
66 Morrison quotes my brief discussion in endnote QN in its entirety: “During the Iran hostage cri-
sis, . . . President Carter asked [White House Counsel] Lloyd Cutler, not the OLC, to tell him 
whether the War Powers Resolution required him to consult Congress about a covert rescue mis-
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No less importantly, Morrison  ignores my description of the way Cutler 
used his position “as a springboard for public interventions on major 
constitutional questions.”67  Most notably, Cutler argued that Carter’s 
SALT Agreement with the Soviet Union could be ratified by simple 
majorities of both houses as a congressional-executive agreement and 
did not require approval by two-thirds of the Senate.68  This episode is 
of enduring importance. 
To see why, consider that the relationship between the WHC and 
the OLC is utterly mysterious to most lawyers, let alone to most Ameri-
cans.  So imagine the scene when some future White House Counsel is-
sues a legal opinion, rubberstamping the President’s latest power- grab, 
with the peroration: “Ever since Lloyd Cutler assumed the position as 
White House Counsel in NVTV, this office has, from to time, taken the 
lead in explaining the constitutional foundations for major presidential 
initiatives  . . . .”  
Given pervasive ignorance dealing with Beltway arcana, this fa-
mous precedent will go a long way toward legitimating the White 
House decision to cut out the OLC.  Instead of conceding impropriety, 
our hypothetical Counsel can summon up the great spirit of Lloyd Cut-
ler in support of his leading role.  After establishing his distinguished 
pedigree, Counsel can reinforce his claim to authority with a host of ad-
ditional arguments: After all, there’s nothing in the Constitution that 
requires the President to prefer the OLC to the WHC.  Article II simply 
tells the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”69 
— it doesn’t tell him where to get his legal advice.  Moreover, as Morri-
son acknowledges, the OLC’s traditional role is principally based on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
sion” to free the hostages.  DECLINE, supra note N, at OPM n.QN (alterations in original).  Nothing he 
says undercuts this claim: the only person Carter directly consulted was Cutler, and at no point did 
anybody ask for the OLC’s opinion on the matter. 
  Morrison tries to extenuate this breach by pointing out that Cutler did ask Attorney General 
Griffin Bell to sign on.  But Bell was in no position to say “no.”  As Morrison recognizes, the AG 
and his immediate office has left serious interpretive issues to the OLC since the NVSM’s.  See 
Alarmism, supra note P, at NTPR.  Moreover, Bell didn’t ask the OLC even though it had recently 
written an elaborate opinion on war power issues, and could have responded within hours with an 
informed judgment – well within the four day window for decision.  Moreover, Morrison recogniz-
es that Cutler was deciding “a question not resolved in the OLC opinion . . . .”  Id. at NTPS n.NUN. 
  The moral of this story is not, as Morrison suggests, “that on serious matters of this sort, the 
President needs the Justice Department.”  Sadly, it shows that the President could count on Griffin 
Bell, who was in fact a relatively independent Attorney General, to serve as a rubber- stamp when 
the going got tough.  
  This is one of the three cases that reveal, in Morrison’s view, that my claims are “patently 
false.”  Id. at NTPR.  For the others, see my discussions at infra notes TS and UP. 
67 DECLINE, supra note N, at NNO, OPS n.TP.  
68 In the end, President Carter succumbed to Senate protests, and submitted SALT II as a treaty, 
before finally withdrawing it entirely after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.  See Bruce Acker-
man & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, NMU HARV. L. REV. TVV, VMP (NVVR). 
69 U.S. CONST. art. II, § P, cl. Q. 
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executive order, not Congressional statutes.70  If the President prefers to 
treat his Counsel as a modern-day Cutler, there can be no question that 
the bureaucracy and military will follow his lead — at least until the 
courts enter into the field. 
Undoubtedly, the Cutler precedent won’t stifle all grumbling from 
Beltway cognoscenti.71  But it will make it much tougher to convince 
the generality of lawyerdom, as well as the broader public, that they are 
witnessing a dreadful act of legal usurpation — even if that’s precisely 
what is happening.72 
While Morrison entirely ignores my discussion of the Cutler episode, 
it’s clear that he rejects my larger point, remarking elsewhere that 
“there is nothing novel or untoward about the White House Counsel 
‘defend[ing] the president in public.’”73 
I dissent: Since the traditional role of the OLC is based on little more 
than practice, it is undermined whenever the WHC disrupts this prac-
tice by publicly taking the lead on a high-priority political initiative — 
each intervention builds up another precedent in a counter-tradition, 
legitimating abuse of the WHC when the presidency experiences one of 
its episodic eruptions of illegality.74 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
70 See Alarmism, supra note P, at NTMV & nn.TT–TV, NTNM & n.UO, NTNN & n.VM.  I describe the pre-
vailing legal situation in DECLINE, supra note N, at OOV n.PS. 
71 Within the Beltway, “the OLC has worked hard at cultivating a reputation for disciplined legal 
judgment that the White House Counsel can only envy.  An OLC opinion helps legitimate the 
president’s initiative.”  DECLINE, supra note N, at VV–NMM.  Since Morrison emphasizes this point, 
Alarmism, supra note P, at NTON–OO, I want to emphasize my agreement.  But the OLC’s superior 
reputation hardly will be decisive in the White House cost-benefit analysis.  If it learns, through its 
telephone conversations, that the OLC is going to say “no” to a high-priority presidential initiative, 
“it’s better for the White House lawyers to write up their own legal memo telling the president 
yes.”  DECLINE, supra note N, at NMM.  As I explain in the text, a White House decision to make an 
end-run around the OLC will not generate much political backlash, since very few Americans have 
even heard of the OLC, let alone grasp its traditional role within the higher reaches of the execu-
tive establishment. 
72 Morrison’s constitutional views make it clear that the President is well within his authority to 
rely on his Counsel’s opinion.  See Alarmism, supra note P, at NTQS n.ONU.  I take a more complex 
position on the President’s institutional responsibilities to determine what “the laws” require before 
he is entitled to “take care” that they be “executed.”  See DECLINE, supra note N, at NQU; infra page 
PV–QM. 
73 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTQM (quoting DECLINE, supra note N, at NNQ). 
74 Morrison displays a similar blindness in his critique of my treatment of presidential  signing 
statements.  My main point is to demonstrate how, “[o]ver the short space of twenty-five years, 
modern presidents have gone a remarkably long way in legitimating the notion that they can diso-
bey statutes after the most casual gesture in the direction of the Constitution.”  DECLINE, supra 
note N, at VR.  Morrison agrees that signing statements don’t “provide a complete analysis,” but 
says that they usefully serve as “devices for alerting Congress and the interested public” within the 
Beltway to search for further elaboration of the Administration’s rationales.  He recognizes, how-
ever, that “not many members of the general public are likely to bother” to ask further questions.  
Alarmism, supra note P, at NTNO n.VP.  This is precisely my main concern — John Q. Public will 
simply glance at the headlines, and learn that the President is refusing to heed Congressional en-
actments that he is simultaneously signing into law — “I didn’t know that the President could do 
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But one basic fact restricted Cutler’s capacity to displace the OLC.  
Like John Dean, he only had five lawyers working for him.  While they 
were a high-powered group, they were in no position to displace the 
twenty-five superlawyers at the OLC on a regular basis.  But the WHC 
staff began to grow by fits and starts over the next two decades — in-
creasing to fourteen during the Iran-Contra Affair, and really taking off 
under Bill Clinton when the staff moved into the low forties during the 
impeachment controversy.75 
This puts a distinctive meaning on a second episode that Morrison 
puts under his microscope,76 since OLC displacement was becoming a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
such a thing,” he might (justifiably) wonder.  But over time, these headlines will create the general 
impression that it’s perfectly OK for the President to make high-visibility constitutional pro-
nouncements within the ten-day period he has to put his signature on a bill — and that is a very 
bad thing. 
75See DECLINE, supra note N, at OPS n.TS, and sources cited therein. 
76 Morrison also presents an elaborate refutation of a third episode I discuss in a single sentence: 
“[T]he WHC under George H.W. Bush refused to ask the OLC for an opinion concerning the line-
item veto of appropriation measures because it disagreed with the likely result.”  DECLINE, supra 
note N, at OPM n.QN.  As this description makes plain, I did not claim that White House Counsel 
Boydon Gray asserted authority to make the ultimate decision on this issue.  Indeed, I specifically 
mention the OLC’s intransigence on the line-item veto as a praiseworthy example of “independ-
ence.”  DECLINE, supra note N, at OOR n.OT.  Yet, according to Morrison, this is one of the three cas-
es in which my description is “patently false.”  But there is in fact no disagreement between us.  To 
the contrary, both of us refer to the same source as the basis for our discussion, citing Jeremy Rab-
kin, At the President’s Side: The Role of the White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn NVVP, at SP. 
  I used the “line-item veto” affair to illustrate another, more subtle, form of White House in-
fluence: the WHC can simply tell OLC opinion-writers to stop in their tracks if repeated phone 
calls reveal that they are determined to say “no.”  Even if the OLC remains steadfast in the short-
run, this show of power will weaken the OLC over the long-run, given its strong institutional in-
centives to remain in the loop.  See DECLINE, supra note N, at NMM–MN (the very passage to which 
my endnote is appended).  My sin, if it is one, was to make the book seem user-friendly to a general 
audience by reducing the formidable number of endnote-citations in the text.  This sometimes led 
me to combine distinct ideas into a single endnote to support the broader textual discussion.  
  For the same reason, I did not emphasize all the incidents of WHC “end-running” that I un-
covered in my research.  Consider, for example, this passage from the essay by Jeremy Rabkin that 
serves as a common source for both Morrison and me: 
Charles Cooper [head of the OLC under the second Reagan Administration] complained 
that OLC advice was frequently discounted by the White House.  In Cooper’s view, the 
White House lawyers were more concerned with immediate political goals than with the 
constitutional doctrines on presidential power emphasized by OLC. 
Rabkin, supra at UU.  Cooper’s complaints are to some degree corroborated by Peter Wallison, 
Reagan’s White House Counsel during roughly the same period, who remarks that, “If there’s a 
constitutional question about the president’s power . . . [the WHC] can make that decision on their 
own without consulting the OLC.”  DECLINE, supra note N, at NNR.  But neither Cooper nor Walli-
son give concrete examples, so I didn’t make anything of this episode in the book.  Now that Mor-
rison has launched a broad-based challenge, I hope that some scholar finds the time to dig through 
the archives in search of evidence that might corroborate, or disconfirm, this testimony. 
  I also report that “White House lawyers took the lead” in preparing signing statements dur-
ing the presidency of George H. W. Bush — in sharp contrast to the practice prevailing in the 
Reagan and Clinton Administrations.  See DECLINE, supra note N, at VN.  This served as a prelude 
to the egregious preemption of the OLC during the George Bush Administration, when White 
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much more significant possibility during the Clinton years.  This one 
involved the legality of Hillary Clinton’s effort to lead secret strategy 
sessions on health care reform.  The WHC, not the OLC, said “yes,” rul-
ing that her participation was consistent with conflict-of-interest rules 
and the Federal Advisory Committee Act.77  Morrison agrees that this 
was a plain case of displacement: if any matter should have been de-
ferred to the OLC, it was an issue affecting the President’s wife.78  But 
Bill thought Hillary was central to his Administration’s signature initia-
tive, and so that was that: another big precedent was added to the chain 
initiated by Lloyd Cutler.   
Interestingly, George W. Bush initially reacted to the mushrooming 
size of the WHC by dramatically cutting it back — as late as OMMR, 
there were only fourteen lawyers in his White House office79 — though 
this reduction was outweighed by the addition of the redoubtable David 
Addington, Cheney’s counsel, to the circle of White House lawyers.  As 
Decline and Fall explains, Addington and Yoo were key players in an 
ad hoc “war council,” convened by Counsel Alberto Gonzales, to ham-
mer out key legal positions in the “war on terror.”80  Yoo actively en-
gaged in these intensive sessions.  But at the very same time, he failed to 
follow standard OLC consultation procedures in preparing his torture 
memo. Indeed, the very existence of this memo was withheld from other 
lawyers at the OLC, even after the Assistant Attorney General had 
signed it.81  If this episode doesn’t support my claim that the OLC’s 
“claim to legal authority is already visibly declining,” what does? 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
House lawyer David Addington dominated the signing statement process, “churning out hundreds 
of conclusory denunciations of congressional legislation.”  See id. at VO–VP. 
77 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTPV. 
78 Id.  Morrison tries to extenuate this breach by pointing out that the Administration had not yet 
placed its own officials into key positions at the OLC.  Id.  But the OLC still had its small comple-
ment of senior government lawyers, together with hold-over attorney-advisers — and one would 
suppose that it is precisely such nonpartisan types who were best suited to take an impartial view 
of Ms. Clinton’s legal problems.  The matter became even more embarrassing when it was subse-
quently revealed that, at the time of her immersion into secret strategy sessions, Ms. Clinton had 
not yet transferred her financial assets into a blind trust, as was required by the conflict-of-interest 
rules generally imposed on all federal employees, with the exception of the President and Vice-
President.  See Rabkin, supra note TS, at VQ. 
79 See Michael A. Fletcher, Quiet But Ambitious White House Counsel Makes Life of Law, WASH. 
POST, June ON, OMMR, at ANV. 
80 DECLINE, supra note N, at NMR–MS. 
81 As Martin Lederman reports: “I worked as an Attorney-Advisor at OLC from NVVQ–OMMO, and I 
was still at the Office when it issued the OMMO Torture Opinion.  I did not know anything about 
that Opinion, however — not even of its existence — until it became the subject of public  
debate . . . .” Lederman, Understanding the Torture Memos (Part I), BALKINIZATION (Jan. T, 
OMMR), http://balkin.blogspot.com/OMMR/MN/understanding-olc-torture-memos-part-i.html.  Leder-
man also describes the way in which the preparation of the torture memos breached standard OLC 
consultation procedures. 
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In my view, Yoo’s involvement at Gonzales’s crisis sessions “repre-
sent[s] an intensification, not a repudiation, of past practices of collabo-
ration between the OLC and the White House.”82  Since Morrison has 
no trouble with telephone “importunings” from Addington, why not a 
pressure-packed lunch or two, or a series of intensive White House “war 
councils”?  Instead of taking this problem seriously, Morrison focuses 
on a different aspect of Bush’s war on terror.  I am unpersuaded by his 
critique,83 but our dispute should not divert attention from the main 
point: the WHC did in fact preempt the OLC’s standard decision-
making processes during the torture memo crisis, and it should take its 
place alongside key precedents from the Carter and Clinton years. 
Morrison also ignores Gonzales’s role as public spokesman for the 
presidency.  The White House Counsel took to the New York Times to 
defend the Administration’s refusal to abide by the Geneva Conven-
tions84 and its use of military commissions.85  So the WHC was not only 
preempting the OLC internally; it was serving as the external legal de-
fender of the President’s high-priority initiatives. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
82 DECLINE, supra note N, at NMS. 
83 This involved the question whether al Qaeda or the Taliban were protected by the Third Gene-
va Convention.  Alarmism, supra note P, at NTPT–PV.  As Lederman reports on the basis of his own 
experience in the office, “traditionally OLC would solicit the views of the State Department before 
rendering any advice on an issue [involving treaty obligations], and would reject the State De-
partment Legal Adviser’s views only after extremely careful consideration.”  See Lederman, supra 
note UN. 
  But that is not what happened here.  Instead, the OLC’s John Yoo and the State Depart-
ment’s William Howard Taft IV submitted warring memos to the White House Counsel, who sent 
the matter on for final decision by the President.  But, of course, the President was no lawyer, and 
was going to rely on his old friend’s legal advice.  As Morrison notices, Alarmism, supra note P, at 
NTPU n.NUV, Gonzales had already briefed the President on the basis of a draft memo, prepared by 
John Yoo that had argued the case for evading the Geneva Convention — even though this memo 
had not yet been signed by Assistant Attorney General Bybee and did not represent the formal 
opinion of the OLC.  In taking this step, Gonzales was displacing the OLC and asserting his au-
thority as Counsel to preempt Jay Bybee as the President’s authoritative legal adviser.  Morrison 
fails to appreciate the significance of this power- play.  Instead he focuses on a later stage of the 
process, when the State Department sought to gain a presidential hearing for its protest at this ear-
lier decision.  By this point, Yoo’s position had received the OLC’s official imprimatur, and Gon-
zales unsurprisingly emphasized the most current OLC memo in the document that Morrison calls 
a “briefing memorandum.”  Id. at NTPU.  Morrison exaggerates the significance of this lawyerly 
move, asserting that Gonzales’s reliance on the OLC opinion “does not undermine, but rather rein-
forces, OLC’s legal interpretive authority.”  Id. at NTPU n.NVO. 
  I draw a different lesson: The White House Counsel called the legal shots from the begin-
ning.  Gonzales’s “briefing memorandum” is better understood as part of the Counsel’s continuing 
effort to dominate the legal process.  See generally, JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS PV–QP 
(OMMS) (elaborating Gonzales’s central role in evading Geneva).  I leave it to you to decide whether 
my interpretation is  “patently false.”  Alarmism, supra note P, at NTPR.  For my treatment of other 
disputed episodes, see supra notes SS and TS. 
84  Alberto Gonzales, The Rule of Law and the Rules of War, N.Y. TIMES, May NR, OMMQ, at ANT. 
85  Alberto Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. PM, OMMN, at AOT. 
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Which brings us to Obama’s WHC.  As the new President took of-
fice, the egregious lapses of the Bush WHC might have prompted a 
fundamental re-think.  Not only had the Bush WHC run amok; but it 
was building on similar, if less pathological, patterns from preceding 
administrations.  Rethinking the OLC was even more important be-
cause George Bush had allowed the WHC staff to expand from fourteen 
in OMMR to twenty-six in OMMU.86  Was this a moment to order another 
cut-back, making it harder for White House lawyers to displace the Of-
fice of Legal Counsel? 
Obama’s answer was “no.”  He increased the staff size instead.  
Technically speaking, the office grew to thirty-seven lawyers in OMNM — 
but realistically, only twenty-four are in a position to provide the Presi-
dent serious legal advice.  Nevertheless, the twenty-four WHC slots are 
precisely equal in number to the legal slots available in the OLC.  
Moreover, the heads of the WHC — first Gregory Craig, then Robert 
Bauer — have done a splendid job recruiting a series of distinguished 
practitioners and law professors to the office.  Like all other members of 
the White House staff, they are fierce Obama loyalists, working OQ-T to 
make his Administration a success.87  While the WHC has many irons 
in the fire, they have the institutional capacity to displace the OLC if 
the President asks them to provide him with their independent legal 
advice — as Morrison (reluctantly) concedes.88  At the same time, 
Obama’s WHC has followed in Cutler’s footsteps in publicly defending 
controversial White House initiatives.89 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
86 Compare Jon Ward, White House Beefs Up Legal Staff, WASH. TIMES, July ON, OMMV, at BN, 
with Fletcher, supra note TV (noting that there were fourteen attorneys in the WHC in OMMR). 
87 The White House staffing report indicates that there were thirty-seven lawyers on the WHC 
staff in OMNM.  See OMNM Annual Report to Congress on White House Staff, THE WHITE HOUSE, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/disclosures/annual-records/OMNM (last visited May OR, 
OMNN); see also DECLINE, supra note N, at NNO, OPM n.QM.  But thirteen of those lawyers were con-
cerned with executive appointments and other matters, leaving approximately twenty-four availa-
ble for general assignments.  I expect the staff to increase further, now that the Republicans have 
taken over the House, requiring the White House to prepare itself for a series of wide-ranging 
House investigations.  It appears that the WHC is already beefing itself up for the coming conflicts, 
see White House Hires Lawyer from DOJ, THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Jan. NN, OMNN), 
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/OMNN/MN/white-house-hires-lawyer-from-doj.html, and I expect a 
significant expansion in overall size over the next two years. 
88 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTPP. 
89 Morrison takes issue with my treatment of Mr. Craig’s defense of White House policy “czars” in 
a public letter to Senator Feingold, pointing out that Craig expressly cited an OLC opinion in de-
fense of his position.  True enough, but my point, once again, involved Craig’s decision to follow in 
Cutler’s footsteps in “defend[ing] the president in public,” DECLINE, supra note N, at NNQ —  as 
Morrison recognizes, Alarmism, supra note P, at NTQM–QN.  Morrison and I simply disagree as to 
whether the WHC’s rising public profile should be a source of concern.  Craig was more sensitive 
to these issues when discussing his role in another high-profile initiative involving the Administra-
tion’s effort to close Guantanamo.  In an excellent overview of the Administration’s failed efforts, 
the Washington Post reported: “It was often assumed on the Hill and elsewhere that White House 
counsel Gregory B. Craig was in charge, but he rejected that characterization in an interview and 
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No need to exaggerate: Obama’s WHC has thus far put in a perfect-
ly creditable performance, avoiding anything resembling the worst 
lapses of the Clinton and Bush years.  But by rehabilitating the WHC 
after its reputation was shattered, President Obama has set the stage for 
future Presidents to use the office as a platform for authoritative-
looking documents in support of unilateralist power-plays.  This is the 
context that makes Morrison’s review more than-unusually significant: 
He is emerging from a stint at Obama’s WHC to tell his fellow academ-
ics that everything is under control, and there is no need to worry about 
the future. 
But if I am right, we are simply living at a moment of relative calm 
between storms: Watergate, Iran-Contra, Torture Memos, and then the 
deluge? 
Recall that each Administration sweeps out the entire WHC staff 
and brings in its own team of super-competent super-loyalists.  At the 
same time, it can replace all the top officials at the OLC with more su-
per-loyalists.  The small cadre of career OLC lawyers will be in no posi-
tion to resist this political juggernaut — especially now that Jay Bybee 
and John Yoo have escaped professional censure from the Justice De-
partment. 
Within this politicized setting, the OLC’s generally facilitative ap-
proach, and its commitment to the “democratic mandate” of the sitting 
President, creates a powerful dynamic encouraging the OLC to develop 
“creative” legal arguments endorsing problematic initiatives.  And if the 
OLC balks, the President can respond by withdrawing the matter from 
the OLC and asking his WHC to provide its own authoritative legal 
opinion and defend it aggressively in public.  There have been cases in 
which “enlightened statesmen” have resisted these pressures, but do we 
really have to take our chances?   
Not to worry, Morrison tells us, we can still count on the Court to 
hold firm, even if the OLC or the WHC rubber-stamp the next presi-
dential power-play.90  After all, Bush didn’t defy recent Supreme Court 
decisions restraining his all-out war on terror, and Nixon capitulated 
when the Court insisted on a hand-over of his confidential tape record-
ings during the Watergate affair.  But Bush’s compliance was grudging 
at best;91 and Nixon backed down under threat of impeachment.  These 
recent episodes should not deflect attention from the larger lessons of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
said he was pushing the boundaries of his office to be as involved as he was.”  Peter Finn & Anne 
E. Kornblut, How the White House Lost on Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Apr. OP, OMNN, at ANP. 
90 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTMN–MS. 
91 Morrison concedes this point.  See id. at NTMM. 
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American history: where Presidents from Jefferson to Roosevelt have 
repeatedly forced the Court into chaotic retreat.92 
When the next transformative leader takes charge in the White 
House, he will be in a position to intimidate the Court with an unprece-
dented range of bureaucratic, military, and media tools.  Perhaps the 
Justices will remain steadfast; but it is best to reform the system now, so 
that we don’t have to rely so heavily on their fortitude. 
III.  REMEDIES 
Here is where Morrison and I part company.  Though he repeatedly 
concedes that the existing set-up at the OLC and the WHC generates 
risks of abuse,93 he disdains all talk of structural reform, contenting 
himself with minor variations on the status quo. 
His modest proposal: the OLC should take its recent Best Practices 
memo seriously, and dramatically increase the speed and frequency 
with which it publishes its opinions to the outside world.94  This will 
provoke an intensified exchange with the larger profession that will 
generate a virtuous cycle over time.  The dynamics of this cycle go 
something like this:95 When faced with the prospect of sustained profes-
sional critique, the OLC will tone down extravagant claims for execu-
tive power; and if it doesn’t, it will soon confront hard-hitting commen-
taries that will damage the professional standing of the opinion-writers 
— hurting their prospects for future employment.  The ensuing series of 
critical put-downs will sober up OLC lawyers when they confront the 
task of writing the next high-profile opinion.  Rather than repeat the 
cycle of extravagant-claims-followed-by-professional-humiliation, they 
will generate an increasingly thoughtful work-product.  These displays 
of virtuosity will increase the Office’s appeal to the best and brightest 
lawyers, who will take up its job-offers despite other stellar job oppor-
tunities — leading to an ever-more-disciplined and thoughtful work-
product; and so forth. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
92 Morrison’s discussion of John Marshall’s views fails to confront, or even cite, my very different 
portrayal of Marshall in The Failure of the Founding Fathers NNN–OOP (OMMR).  While Morrison’s 
Marshall plays the role of classical sage drawing a clear distinction between the role of the judicial 
and executive branches in constitutional interpretation, Alarmism, supra note P, at NSVQ–VR, the 
Marshall on display in Failure is in disorderly retreat in response to the Jeffersonian juggernaut, 
barely managing to escape impeachment and consenting to his Court’s refusal, in Stuart v. Laird, 
to defend the proud declarations of principle proclaimed only one week before in Marbury v. Mad-
ison.  Id. at NSP–NVU.  For reflections on the relationship between Jefferson’s encounter with the 
Marshall Court and Roosevelt’s confrontations with the New Deal Court, see id. at OQR–SS.   
93 Morrison peppers his prose with lawyerly caveats — “Risks of [a major crisis] can never be en-
tirely discounted, nor should they be ignored” — while simultaneously telling us that, for all practi-
cal purposes, we can indeed ignore the risk.  See, e.g., Alarmism, supra note P, at NTMS. 
94 Id. at NTOR. 
95 Id. at NTOQ–OS. 
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Morrison overestimates the power of his cycle of virtue.  It works 
most effectively if an extravagant OLC opinion encounters (near) uni-
versal condemnation by professional commentators.  But this is unlike-
ly, given the skewed distribution of the Office’s outside critics.  Keep in 
mind that most law professors and law review editors have barely 
heard of the OLC, and don’t give its opinions nearly the attention they 
lavish on the high federal and state courts.  This means that a dispro-
portionate share of “outside” commentary will be produced by former 
insiders at the OLC who have returned to universities or Washington 
think-tanks. 
These “inside-outsiders” have been thoroughly socialized into “the 
pro-executive tenor”96 of the Office’s jurisprudence.  As a consequence, 
the current crop of OLC “insiders” have reason to expect a good deal of 
applause if they push the envelope of pro-executive precedents written 
by their predecessors to justify more-and-more extraordinary acts of ex-
ecutive unilateralism.  This show of support from “inside-outsiders” 
won’t necessarily drown out the voices of other professional critics.  But 
they will suffice to generate a mixed chorus of yeas-and-nays that will 
generally allow the OLC staff to preserve its professional reputation in-
tact: “After all,” they will explain to future employers, “nobody can rea-
sonably expect unanimous applause when the OLC is making high-
profile, and politically consequential, decisions.  You shouldn’t hold it 
against me if my work has drawn its share of professional attacks.  All 
this controversy shows is that I can take the heat that inevitably comes 
with important decisions — exhibiting just the kind of staying-power 
you’ll want from me in my next job.”  
OLC’s recent opinion upholding President Obama’s decision to 
bomb Libya provides a case study on the limits of Morrison’s cycle of 
virtue.  The President refused to consult Congress although the War 
Powers Resolution only expressly authorizes military action without 
congressional authorization in cases involving a “national emergency 
created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, 
or its armed forces.”97  But Libya hadn’t made any such attack.  So the 
OLC would have to engage in “creative lawyering” to tell us why the 
President was constitutionally empowered to go beyond the Resolution 
and initiate his bombing campaign.  Its difficulties were compounded 
by Obama’s campaign statements that: “[t]he President does not have 
power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack 
in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent 
threat to the nation.”98  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
96 I use Morrison’s term here.  Id. at NTNS. 
97 War Powers Resolution, RM U.S.C. § NRQN(c) (OMMS). 
98 Charlie Savage, Barack Obama’s Q&A, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. OM, OMMT, 
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/OMMU/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA/. 
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Nevertheless, this aspect of Obama’s “democratic mandate” didn’t 
give the OLC much trouble when it came to writing its opinion: it up-
held the President’s initiative without mentioning Obama’s contrary 
campaign commitments.99  It built its case instead on the strongly pro-
presidential OLC opinions from past administrations, developing their 
principles in novel ways to ratify Obama’s action. 
At this point, the OLC redeemed Morrison’s hopes by publishing its 
opinion on April T — less than a week after it was issued.  Within 
hours, insider-outsider Jack Goldsmith published a brief note which ac-
cepted the opinion’s basic premises and pointed to the lawyerly ways it 
moved beyond previous OLC precedents.100  But it took Michael Glen-
non only one week to respond with a strong critique that challenged the 
opinion’s roots in the constitutional tradition.101  Glennon, like Gold-
smith, is one of the field’s leading scholars, but he has never served in 
the OLC, gaining his practical experience as a Senate staffer.102  For 
present purposes, only a paragraph of Glennon’s conclusion is relevant: 
 One would not expect OLC to make the case against the President’s ac-
tions.  Its opinion on Libya, like its other opinions, is an effort to put the 
best legal face on those actions.  The President is entitled to no less.  But no 
one should mistake OLC’s advocacy as a disinterested evaluation of com-
peting constitutional claims.  It is, in truth, not an opinion at all but a 
brief.103 
Here is a distinguished professor at the Fletcher School of Law and 
Diplomacy telling the OLC, in no uncertain terms, that it has utterly 
failed its Morrisonian mission: it has not risen to the occasion to provide 
“its best view of the law,” but has merely produced an advocate’s brief.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
99 Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Re: Authority to Use Military Force in Libya (Apr. N, OMNN), 
available at http://graphicsU.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/world/OMNNMQMN-authority-military-use-in-
libya.pdf.  
100 Jack Goldsmith, Office of Legal Counsel Opinion on Libya, LAWFARE (April T, OMNN), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/OMNN/MQ/office-of-legal-counsel-opinion-on-libya-intervention/.  This 
note supplemented the more elaborate defense of presidential unilateralism that Goldsmith pub-
lished at the very beginning of the Libyan campaign.  See Jack Goldsmith, War Power: The Presi-
dent’s Campaign Against Libya is Constitutional, SLATE (March ON, OMNN), 
http://www.slate.com/id/OOUUUSV/.  I joined this early debate on the other side.  See Bruce Acker-
man, Obama’s Unconstitutional War, FOREIGN POL’Y (March OQ, OMNN), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/OMNN/MP/OQ/obama_s_unconstitutional_war.  But the point 
here isn’t to relitigate the merits, but to suggest the way the evolution of the controversy undercuts 
Morrison’s “cycle of virtue.” 
101 Michael J. Glennon, Forum: The Cost of “Empty Words”: A Comment On the Justice De-
partment’s Libya Opinion, HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. (April NQ, OMNN), http://harvardnsj.com/wp-
content/uploads/OMNN/MQ/Forum_Glennon_Final-Version.pdf.  
102Glennon was an Assistant Counsel, Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate from NVTP to 
NVTT and Legal Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from NVTT to NVUM.   
See Michael J. Glennon, Professor of International Law, THE FLETCHER SCH., 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/faculty/glennon/default.shtml (last visited May OR, OMNN). 
103 Glennon, supra note NMN, at NU. 
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Under the “virtuous cycle” hypothesis, this severe judgment should be 
reverberating in the halls of the Justice Department as I write — gener-
ating an anxious round of soul-searching as the OLC struggles to re-
claim its professional respectability.   
But given the lawyerly endorsement coming from Harvard’s Henry 
L. Shattuck Professor of Law, it will be easy for the OLC to view the 
critique from the Fletcher School as merely an inevitable part of a hard-
hitting lawyerly dispute — and surely nothing that should impair the 
professional standing of the OLC’s opinion-writers? 
Don’t get me wrong: More frequent and rapid publication of OLC 
opinions is a good idea.  But its disciplining potential should not be 
overestimated, especially in a specialist community full of “inside-
outsiders” whose views are often more strongly presidentialist than 
Goldsmith’s.  So even in the relatively placid Washington of today — 
where the centrist Obama reigns in the White House, and al Qaeda is in 
disarray around the world — Morrison’s remedy isn’t enough to sustain 
his vision of the OLC.  And yet he is asking us to rely entirely on the Of-
fice’s “norms” to sustain the rule of law during the tougher times that lie 
ahead.  I hope he is right, but he has given us little reason to join him in 
this pious hope. 
My book calls for a structural remedy.  The President needs the con-
stant advice of the OLC and (a thinned-down) WHC, and he should 
continue to rely on their counsel to meet the challenges of the moment.  
But over the longer run, Administration lawyers should be prepared to 
defend their opinions before a more impartial tribunal, within the exec-
utive branch, whose judgments will normally serve as the authoritative 
statement of the law for the bureaucracy and military.  To kick off de-
bate, I developed a design for a Supreme Executive Tribunal which will 
inevitably generate controversies over particular details.  But for pre-
sent purposes, it’s enough to emphasize three key elements.   
First, members of the tribunal should be insulated from ex parte in-
fluence – no more telephone calls or more blatant forms of White House 
pressure.  The OLC should instead submit formal briefs and oral argu-
ments to the tribunal, just like any other litigant, and then await its 
judgment.   
Second, the tribunal should be aiming to develop a constitutional 
understanding that emphasizes the enduring role of the executive 
branch in the separation of powers, and should reject the notion that 
that the current President’s “democratic mandate” authorizes him to 
revolutionize traditional approaches to constitutional interpretation.  
The tribunal should also hear arguments presented by Congress if a 
substantial number of representatives believe that the President’s ac-
tions are violating Congress’s statutory commands — otherwise, how 
can the tribunal adopt a mature view of the Executive’s proper role in 
the overall system? 
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Third, and last, the tribunal should contain a plurality of judges, 
who have been confirmed by the Senate.  Otherwise, it will remain too 
dependent on the capacity of a single “enlightened statesman” to stand 
up to the short-term political imperatives of the sitting President. 
In short, the tribunal will make decisions, after hearing a broad 
range of arguments, and with its judges engaging in an on-going debate 
as to the “best view of the law” that should govern the executive branch.  
Everything else is open for argument. 
Morrison, however, opposes the entire idea.  He suggests that I “no-
where consider”104 the “profound”105 constitutional question: 
“[W]hether Congress may empower the Tribunal to impose legally bind-
ing obligations on the President himself”?106 
But I do consider this precise question, and discuss at length the 
President’s options when confronting an adverse decision from the tri-
bunal.  Here is a brief excerpt: 
In [some] cases, the president will have no choice: if he is determined to pur-
sue his course, he must defy the tribunal. 
But under very risky conditions.  Once the tribunal has spoken, a wave of 
anxiety will ripple through the civilian and military establishment.  These 
officials normally enjoy absolute immunity when they follow presidential 
orders, but they can’t take this for granted if the tribunal has handed down 
its adverse judgment . . . . [Given their] uncertain loyalty . . . , perhaps the 
president will pause at the brink, and accept the validity of the tribunal’s 
ruling? 
Or perhaps he will respond by escalating the constitutional stakes . . . 
It would be silly to try to predict the outcome.  Even if the tribunal retreats 
before the president’s counterattack, the institutional standoff may have 
salutary consequences.  It will alert ordinary Americans that something 
very troubling is taking place in Washington, making it easier for the Su-
preme Court to intervene effectively later on.107 
These passages explicitly grant the President the power to have the 
last say.  But it situates this power within an institutional context that 
encourages him to take the rule of law far more seriously than he does 
today. 
Moving from constitutional law to jurisprudence, Morrison also 
suggests that my proposal is “premised on the notion that the law has a 
single meaning.”108  To the contrary:109 it is precisely because there is no 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
104 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTQS. 
105 Id. at NTQR. 
106 Id. 
107 DECLINE, supra note N, at NRM–RN. 
108 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTQT. 
109 While I admire aspects of Ronald Dworkin’s legal philosophy, I have consistently rejected his 
“one right answer” thesis.  Compare RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (NVUS) (law as integrity) 
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single right answer in hard cases that the process of reaching a sound 
legal judgment is so important.  If a lawyer fails to hear both sides of 
the argument, and allows one side to brow-beat him over the telephone, 
then his resulting “interpretation” is inherently suspect — no matter 
how he tries to transcend the limits of partisan advocacy.  Within the 
Anglo-American tradition, the rule of law is better understood as a form 
of culture in which a serious commitment requires serious people to 
take both sides of the argument seriously before coming to judgment. 
If the President is to discharge his commitment “take Care” that the 
“Laws” be “faithfully executed,” he has a constitutional responsibility to 
create a tribunal that will in fact consider both sides of the argument 
before advising him as to the nature of his legal obligations.  After all, 
the present arrangements at the OLC and the WHC have evolved in a 
haphazard way over the twentieth century — without any systematic 
effort to consider whether they adequately discharge the presidency’s 
fundamental commitment to the rule of law.  Given the recurrent epi-
sodes of illegality over the last generation, it is past time for the Presi-
dent and Congress to address the basic issues seriously, and pass a stat-
ute that promises better performance in the future. 
This is, at any rate, my argument.110  
But the core of Morrison’s objection is neither constitutional nor ju-
risprudential.  Instead, his insider experience convinces him that my 
high-minded reforms just won’t work out in practice.  To some extent, 
his practical objections are based on a misunderstanding of my pro-
posal;111 but more fundamentally, he thinks that my structural reform is 
far too “disrupt[ive]”112 of established arrangements to warrant serious 
consideration. 
This might seem a compelling objection inside the Beltway, where 
any institutional shake-up can seem like an earthquake.  But in the rest 
of America, an elite reorganization within the executive branch is hard-
ly an earth-shattering event.  To the contrary, it would be greeted with 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
with BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS UN–NSO (NVVN) (interpretation as inter-
generational synthesis). 
110 For further elaboration, see DECLINE, supra note N, at NQU–RM. 
111 Morrison seems to believe that I would allow individual Congressmen to go to the tribunal and 
obtain its opinion on the constitutionality of pending legislation.  Alarmism, supra note P, at NTQQ.  
But my proposal was addressed only to statutes that had already been passed by both houses of 
Congress, see DECLINE, supra note N, at NQS, and rejected any proposal to extend the tribunal’s 
jurisdiction to pending legislation for the reasons Morrison suggests.   
  Morrison is also wrong to suggest that my proposal permits a single Congressman to invoke 
the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  My text gives this privilege to “a significant number of congressional 
representatives” — perhaps a relatively small number of members of a House or Senate committee 
with jurisdiction over the subject matter, perhaps a larger number of members of the body as a 
whole.  See DECLINE, supra note N, at NQS.  These are precisely the (important) matters of detail 
that I hope will be debated. 
112 Alarmism, supra note P, at NTQP. 
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enthusiasm as a sign that Washington insiders can look beyond the poli-
tics of the moment and take constructive steps to avoid the truly mas-
sive disruptions threatened by the next runaway presidency. 
